LEGAL POSITIVISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTEGRATION OF HUMAN VALUES THROUGH CONTRACTUAL RATIONALITY AND MODERN LEGAL MECHANISMS

Abstrak

This article examines the theoretical relationship between legal positivism and human rights  by rejecting the simplistic understanding that positions the two as inherently antagonistic entities. Departing from the normative-dogmatic analysis method and critical legal philosophy, this paper explores the epistemological basis of legal positivism and its implications for normative human rights claims. This article argues that positivists' rejection of human rights is not aimed at the human values it contains, but at the ontological status of human rights as a law that is claimed to apply outside the institutional mechanisms of the state. Legal positivism, as formulated by H.L.A. Hart and Hans Kelsen, rejects the legitimacy of law derived from external morality or metaphysics, but still leaves room for the internalization of moral values through formal recognition procedures. Furthermore, this article analyzes the rationality of the integration of human rights in a positivist state through John Locke's theory of the social contract and modern legal mechanisms in the form of constitutionalization of rights, legislation, and the binding of international law. By elaborating on the concepts of the rule of recognition, Grundnorm, and legal principles as normative reasons in interpretation, this paper emphasizes that the integration of human rights is not a deviation from positivism, but an evolutionary consequence of the modern legal system. The conclusion of this article states that legal positivism, in its institutional and reflective form, provides the most stable juridical foundation for the enactment and enforcement of human rights.